

TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF PEACE RESEARCH

Ten challenges, and some responses

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July, 1984

## Introduction

The International Peace Research Institute Oslo got its fledgling start in January 1959 when the present author was given a grant by the Institute for Social Research in Oslo to draft a research program in the field of peace studies. The program was accepted, with the US social psychologist, Prof. Otto Klineberg as a consultant, and administratively the work started on 1 June 1959, with five researchers and five research programs, and location at the home of Fridtjof Nansen, at Polhögda outside Oslo, Norway.

Hence, 1984 is the twenty-fifth anniversary. Although peace research is as old as humankind I think it is fair to say that this was the first institute after the Second World War openly professing a dedication to the study of "peace" in its very name. Even that had been problematic. Peace was in those years something identified in the West with communism, a very radical concern, just as ten years later-at the height of neo-marxism in Western Europe-it became the symbol of conservatism. From "peace in the world" as a Moscow slogan to "peace in Vietnam" as a Washington slogan, meaning roughly speaking the triumph of communism in the first case and the victory of the United States in the second, the time distance had been a short one. The Norwegian establishment was also sceptical: a high ranking official of the Ministry of Education was sympathetic in general but told the present author: "peace research", what a horrible name! To "war research" there could be no objection.

I myself had a slightly different worry: not that conditions of peace were not more than worthy of being studied, but that "con-

flict" as such also was worthy of being studied without researchers necessarily having to focus on conflict resolution in a peaceful way all the time. The name, as devised by the present author in January 1959, was a compromise: "conflict and peace research". It has stuck, and can today be found in a number of institutes in, for instance, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany. Today I might have preferred to say simply "peace studies"; "peace" because this is more than broad enough and does not only relate to conflict but equally much to, for instance, development; "studies" because "research" is somewhat limiting by - in the minds of many people - having a connotation of empirical research. As will be amply shown later on this is too narrow.

Ours is not the only anniversary these years. In 1964 the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) was founded at meeting in London with important support from UNESCO, thus having its twentieth anniversary 1984. And in 1983 IPRA had its tenth international conference in Győr in Western Hungary, mustering about 300 researchers from all over the world, bearing testimony to peace research activities in at least thirty countries, and above all selfconfidence, a shared feeling of not having to be defensive about the term "peace research". Peace research is simply something one does; like everything else, it can be well done and badly done - and in most cases done neither particularly well nor particularly badly, but something inbetween.

So, as they say: peace research has come of age, from the tiny little beginning in Oslo 1959. What have been some of the

challenges, what have been some of the responses on the way during these 25 years? That story can definitely be told in many different ways, and will probably be told: **one** sign of peace research coming of age is that it is already generating its own historians with ambitious papers (whether this is a good sign is another matter!).

What I shall try to do in this paper is much more limited. I shall only try to indicate some of the major challenges as I have seen them, and the kind of responses that I have developed - perhaps convincing nobody else than myself, and hardly even that. Sometimes the challenges have come from the outside in the form of criticism. Mainly, however, they have come from the inside, simply from my own efforts to try to develop paradigms, frameworks for intellectual pursuits, capable of accommodating, handling, exploring further, even to some extent solving, problems that to most or at least many people would be located under the heading of "peace". So this is some kind of intellectual autobiography, or even travelogue. An appropriate word, since most of the stimulations to my own intellectual odyssey has come from the simple circumstance that I have travelled a lot, done research work in at least fifty countries, and also travelled through time as a futurist and a macro-historian - thus having a considerable amount of challenges which I felt I should somehow try to accommodate.

Three small reflections on exactly this before I start.

First, in retrospect I see more clearly how a researcher sometimes has a choice between living in the world of books and reacting to what other researchers say and write, and living in the world of

reality, trying to react directly to that world in as much as possible a way not mediated by others. Unfortunately, I often sense that other researchers start in the real world, then leave that world, enter the world of books and remain in that world ever after. If anything I have perhaps done that journey in the opposite direction, at least so far. Occasional excursions back to the world of books, also meaning academia in the traditional sense, as a resting place from the considerably more difficult real world have great charms, however. US universities are good at that, being so self-contained.

Second, intellectual work has some similarities with political, even military work. It is a question of mastering intellectual territory, exploring it with the right instruments. And the instruments are never totally adequate; in addition the territory changes the more the instruments are applied. Then, there may be others on the same territory, even many of them, some prospecting for insight with the same concept, some using totally different approaches. This metaphor defines conflict among intellectuals of three kinds: different results with the use of the same instruments; conflicts over which instruments to use; and the most fundamental conflict over whose intellectual territory this is anyhow. Much of what intellectuals do is a question of laying claims to intellectual territory by showing that their concepts can cover more area, more deeply, than others. Often there will have to be a trade-off here. There are those preferring more extensive methods covering a large territory and those preferring more intensive techniques, going much in depth, drilling at precise points.

Obviously there are many who do both. Intellectuals become like gladiators throwing nets, trying to catch as much as possible. No intellectual enjoys being caught in the net of another, seeing his own problems reduced to sub-problems under the much more general optique developed by somebody else. Yet this is the nature of intellectual pursuits, with the work of mathematicians as a clear example, always struggling for ever higher level of generality; always trying to see something as a "special case" of something more general.

Third, the importance of dialogue. The dialogue, not only with other researchers but with people in general, is absolutely crucial in intellectual work. It is a way of trying out one's own strategies and tactics in intellectual spaces, testing the validity by watching carefully the reactions from different corners. Dialogue is only meaningful if it can happen across disciplinary, ideological, national and civilizational borders. If none of these are bridged chances are that what passes for a dialogue is more like looking in the mirror, as so often happens-particularly in think tanks and places of higher learning of "excellence" because the "criteria" makes the people passing those filters homogenous. Of course, no intellectual is obliged to redirect his pursuit in the direction suggested by a critic, or by a friend for that matter. But he is obliged to be sensitive, to pursue inquiries stimulated by dialogue.

The capacity to do so is limited by the rigidity of the paradigm. Hence, ability to open the paradigm in new directions becomes a major factor. And at this point I feel, in general, that the formula is expansion rather than rejection. If an approach is found unsatisfactory when confronted with new challenges the

response should almost never be to reject the approach completely. Rather, the response should be an effort to understand under which conditions the former approach was valid, not only to identify the conditions under which it is not valid. Instead of asking "which one is true, liberalism or marxism", the question would be "under what conditions is the liberal perspective fruitful, under what conditions the marxist". To many this kind of attitude leads to very eclectic results, to a number of both - and rather than either - or. This is true, and by the present author seen as a great advantage rather than as an accusation. To critics who might hope that positions would be given up rather than serve as a basis for further expansion into intellectual territories the conclusion might be more negative. And I would agree if it can be convincingly shown that this intellectual strategy makes intensive intellectual activity, in depth, impossible or at least unlikely. The contrary is more likely.

And with these three remarks permit me to start with the exploration of ten challenge-response dimensions, as I have experienced them.

1. On the definition of peace research.

From the very beginning it was clear that this definition had to contain three components, at least: "peace" as the explicit value of study, approached in an inter-disciplinary and inter-national manner. The last two conditions, were, of course, directed against what was seen as the traditional approach in peace studies: efforts to capture a very complicated phenomenon within the intellectual frameworks of one discipline only, and often very classical disciplines such as history and international law; and efforts to study phenomena that are international in their character from the vantage point of one nation only. Thus, "inter-disciplinary" meant from the very beginning efforts to bridge the gap between "traditional" and "modern" social sciences (bringing into the picture sociology, politology and so on); and "inter-national" also meant "inter-ideological", "inter-bloc", "inter-class", "inter-gender". An inter-disciplinary Norwegian team is interesting but very far from sufficient; expanding it to become a Nordic team does not add much of interest in our conflict-ridden, highly unpeaceful world. The world is the limit.

Also, from the very beginning, it was assumed that the concept "peace" was and should always continue to be considered problematic. The next dimensions are indicative of what such explorations might lead to if it is taken as axiomatic that "peace" has to be explored. An explicit value-orientation implies explicit problem-orientation; not keeping the values hidden under the mystifying slogan of "objectivity".

However, the two other parts of the working definition, contributing a minimum to the description of how the research on the conditions for peace is to be carried out, were also problematic and



underwent changes. At the very minimum "inter-disciplinary" could be interpreted as an institute where researchers from various disciplines would have some contact or even a "society for peace research" that could facilitate all contacts of that kind. And "inter-national" could point in the direction of occasional meetings to discuss views on difficult matters. Although preferable to single-disciplinary approaches by highly uni-national researchers more often than not in line with the policy of their establishment in a rather unquestioning manner (whether this is due to value commitment or more to material interests linked to their salaries) -this very quickly proved to be highly insufficient. Ultimately inter-disciplinarity would have to lead to trans-disciplinarity, to the integration of the perspectives and approaches of several disciplines inside the mind of the individual peace researcher. Ultimately the individual peace researcher is the unit, however much he may benefit from inter-disciplinary networks. It is inside one researcher that new syntheses are most likely to emerge, certainly stimulated by dialogue in the network. And the same applies to the dimension of inter-nationality: ultimately it has to lead to some kind of researcher without a fatherland, a person that can neither be counted upon to mirror the views of the countries establishment, nor the opposite views. From inter-disciplinary and inter-national to trans-disciplinary and trans-national.

It may be objected that this is asking for much. Essentially it means that the original discipline and nationality of the peace researcher would tend to wash out as the researcher matures. It means that when the researcher speaks or writes the listeners and readers will have and should have great difficulties identifying

whence he or she comes. "Aber wer sind Sie eigentlich" was a question I could remember from a German diplomat when I introduced myself as peace researcher, and the question I very often heard later on when an audience uneasily tried to find out within which established social science discipline I was operating. And the same goes for nationality, although in this case I am afraid I have more difficulties concealing my origin. They somehow show.

Of course, the problem should dictate how the problem is analysed, not the discipline in which one happens to be trained or the national location in global territory. But this makes the peace researcher less predictable, from a disciplinary or national angle. He may, however, still be predictable from the first point in the definition: how he conceives of "peace" which necessarily will be close to an ideological position. To this we shall turn immediately. Here some words should only be added on a parallel which is often used, not the least by the present author, to medical science.

I think it can be argued that medical science is based on the same tri-partite definition or point of departure. There is an unashamedly explicit value-bias from the very beginning, in favour of health rather than disease. Medical science, however, is more than the exploration of the conditions of health; the idea is also to teach (medical education) and to act (medical practise). As we shall see peace researchers have been moving in exactly the same directions, although with less success - but then the first 25 years of medical science were perhaps not that successful either. And medical people have also found it extremely useful to explore further the concept of "health"; they are still doing so, in fact.

Then, the research organisation parallels. In the interdisciplinary pot defined as medical science there are many ingredients, physics, chemistry, anatomy, physiology, pathology, as well as pedagogical and practical components. A medical man is well-rounded, he has a holistic approach to his field as well as a specialty or two, and he has to a large extent transcended national borders.

Similarly peace research aims or should aim at becoming ever more holistic, and ever more global. Thus with higher levels of maturity peace researchers from very different parts of the world, and parts of societies, would have not only dialogues but also emerge with quite compatible conclusions as is the case to a large extent, in the international medical community as expressed in the resolutions of the World Health Organizations. Of course this means that mistakes can be made, and that they can become magnified through consensus when everybody makes the same mistakes. And here the peace researcher faces a great difficulty: his advice and his practise may concern many more people than the individual surgeon who after all is operating on only one person at a time. This should serve as a warning to peace researchers against becoming too self-confident, and against developing an easy consensus. Of course, that is easily done as long as peace researchers carry little responsibility and are mainly academics, and in opposition, engaged in criticism. It becomes more important, not if, but when responsibility comes.

My own experience may serve as some tiny confirmation. Very much demanded in a world divided into nations etc. and an intellectual world divided into disciplines are precisely more global and holistic approaches. This is what peace research should also aim at; in addition to well informed, more limited studies.

2. On the definition of peace as absence of violence.

That peace has something to do with the absence of violence is so widespread as an idea that any concept of peace research would have to accommodate this notion. However, from the very beginning this was seen as too negative. In a sense the inspiration was taken from medical science where health can be seen as the absence of disease (meaning absence of symptoms of disease), but also as something more positive: as the building of a healthy body capable of resisting diseases, relying on its own forces or health sources. Correspondingly a concept of "positive peace" emerged, built around such ideas as "harmony", "cooperation" and "integration". Peace research was to consider both the negative and positive aspects of peace, both the conditions for absence of violence in general and war in particular, and the conditions for both peace building - perhaps referring to the action needed for negative peace as peace-keeping and peace-making could then be used to cover both. Again, exactly what is put into the twin ideas of negative and positive peace is not so important as the broad agreement that peace studies should cover both, there expanding the field of study from prevention and control of war to the study of peaceful relations in general.

However, this important expansion of the field very quickly proved insufficient. I remember vividly my own experience of what at that time was called Rhodesia (or more precisely Southern Rhodesia) shortly after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence November 1965. Studying some statistics made available to me in Harare (then

Salisbury) it became clear that there had been very little inter-racial violence in the period between domestic and national independence, from 1923-65. In a certain sense there was harmony, cooperation integration. But was this peace? With the blatant exploitation, with blacks being denied most opportunities for development given to the white, with flagrant inequality whereby whites were making about twenty times as much for exactly the same job as blacks not to mention; with the basic fact that this was still a white colony, regardless of how independent in a technical sense those whites were? The German word for cemetery is Friedhof, peace yard ---

The concept of "structural violence" was born out of that encounter, but deeply inspired by Gandhi's approach to the same subject although he did not use that term. For a long time I had tried to liberate myself from the built-in actor-oriented perspective of so much Western social science, basing analyses very much on the capabilities of the actors, and also on their motivations. That the motivation is important in judging, religiously or legally ethical quality of an individual act goes without saying. But in so doing the characteristics of the structures are often disregarded, because these are settings within which individuals may do enormous amounts of harms to other human beings without ever intending to do so, just performing their regular duties as a job defined by the structure. Social political consciousness is to understand from the structure works.

Structural violence was then seen as unintended harm done to human beings. Usually this takes place as a process, working slowly as the way misery in general, and hunger in particular, erodes and

finally kills human beings. If it works quickly it is more likely to be noticed and strong positions for and against will build up so that moral stands emerge. Direct violence is intended, usually quick and for that reason easily discovered since the person who was very much alive a second ago is now dead - hence, an easy focus of attention even in civilizations with a low level of political consciousness.

In a sense I do not think the issue has to be argued. Violence is violence, in a sense to be explored in the next section regardless of how it is exercised. But the implication of this extension of the perspective on violence is a major one from the point of view of peace research strategy. Whereas the focus on direct violence would lead to analyses of the capabilities and motivations of international and intranational actors with efforts to create institutions that can prevent them from exercising direct violence, (for instance by punishing those who do) the focus on structural violence will lead to a critical analysis of structures and possibly to efforts to transform violence-pregnant structures into less violent ones. A basic transformation of a structure is usually referred to as a revolution, so this perspective is more welcome among radicals just as the institutional perspective is more welcome among liberals/conservatives. Again the attitude advocated here is both-and, not a question of either-or.

### 3. Violence as obstacles for basic needs satisfaction

If peace is defined as the absence of violence, at least negative peace, regardless of the source of violence, then the question

arises: what is violence? In the first run an anthropocentric approach must be permitted, focussing on violence against human beings. In my experience the best approach here is to try to root violence in the concept of basic human needs, even given the shortcomings of that concept. Such shortcomings, however, are not necessarily unwelcome: in a complex and contradictory reality such as the subject matter of peace research definitions can not, and consequently should not, be too perfect.

Four classes of needs with their negations are indicated in Table 1.

Table 1. Four classes of needs/four classes of violence

	Direct violence Actor- generated	Structural violence Structure- generated
more somatic, material	SURVIVAL violence HOLOCAUST	WELFARE misery SILENT HOLOCAUST
more spiritual, non-material	FREEDOM repression KZ, GULAG	IDENTITY alienation SPIRITUAL DEATH

The two dichotomies used to construct the table should not be taken too absolutely; they are indicative of ways of cutting into the totality of human needs. But the claim is that the four classes indicated are universal even if their specific definition, and how they are satisfied, vary much in historical time and social space.

I have added under the negations of the classes of needs the extreme negations; the four major evils, to put it that way. First, there is holocaust - extermination-whether associated with Wannsee Protokolle and Auschwitz, or nuclear arms deployment decisions and nuclear war. Then there is the silent holocaust (taken from the title of a forth coming book by George Kent on the political economy of hunger), more than well enough known from the situation in the Third world today. Then, KZ and Gulag, the symbols of Hitlerite and Stalinist extremist repression respectively. And finally there is the fourth evil, so often forgotten: the spiritual death coming to people to whom life has no meaning; there is nothing worth identifying with, time just passes through the person rather than the person evolving through time.

These are the four extreme types of violence; they are the major foci of work for peace research; but the minor forms are also to be covered by peace studies. Then, the positive forms, the needs to be satisfied: they would be the focus of positive peace research, whether or not such formulas as harmony, cooperation, and integration point to fruitful ways of attaining their satisfaction.

One very basic point in this connection: I belong to those who very strongly oppose any attempt to impose priorities on these four classes of needs. In a trivial sense, with the biological organism close to death from direct or structural violence it is empirically true that human beings fight for survival and welfare (food, clothes, shelter and so on) more than anything else.



But I refuse to accept those very extreme conditions as the basis for a general theory of priorities. Rather, it is always my experience that when such theories are accepted they tend to lead to bad politics. Thus, put survival above freedom and the result may be capitulationism (better blue-red than dead); put freedom above survival and the result may be an invitation to nuclear suicide (better dead than blue-red). Put welfare above freedom, and the result is usually efforts to feed etc. the population very much the same way as it is done in a zoological garden, with no freedom and identity, but plenty of repression and alienation. Or put identity above all of them and the result might be the hermit living in a cave, close to God but also to nothing else. Chances are he will not even attain what he single mindedly seeks.

This is not to say that in concrete situations in time and space there may not be glaring deficits that have to be corrected by policies that assume priorities. But this is not the same as a general theory about the order in which needs have to be satisfied, for instance starting with survival (otherwise nothing else is of any interest ---) then going on to welfare, and then trying to tackle the problem of freedom and identity. The experience seems to indicate that if one so does it will be at the expense of solid structures in order to assure a single-minded concentration on one class of needs; structures that may be very difficult to undo after they have been operating for some time. Also, the position indicated by systematically assuming priorities is a very modest position, too modest in fact. It is not the task of peace research to accept priorities that have emerged over time as the easy way out; the

task of peace research should rather be to be immodest, to set the goals high, to try to devise those policies by means of which all four classes of needs might be fulfilled and hence all four classes of violence be avoided. To think and act holistically, in short

It should be noted that the fourth evil is different from the other three. To be killed and to be repressed are both bad, not only from the point of view of the victims but also from the point of view of the rulers since they might be afraid that the victims, or their sympathizers, might one day hit back. As a matter of fact, history shows that they often do. Spiritual death, an extreme form of mass apathy, works differently. People become exactly that, apathetic; withdrawing like mice into their holes, and do not hit back. They just recede into passivity. Something of the same actually applies to the silent holocaust: it is silent, working slowly through exploitative, hunger and illness-producing structures, and people die one by one, usually silently. As such it is a form of violence preferable from the elite point of view because they can more easily get away with it, wrapping it up in statistics, Apathy, however, does not even show up in statistics; the indicators being vague/<sup>weak.</sup>

It should be noted, in passing, that what has been said in this third section could just as well be taken as a point of departure for development studies as for peace studies. The two are actually very similar, and should be regarded as twins, as two sides of the same coin. In peace studies there will in general be more of a tendency to focus on direct violence and particularly of the somatic kind; in development studies more on structural violence and also of the somatic kind. The extension from a somatic to a

more mental/spiritual focus is a very important one and should be undertaken by both fields lest they develop too much of a materialistic bias in their approaches. But in addition to that they should also be able to see each other as complementary, as parts of a more holistic approach that might be called "peace and development studies", for that matter. Incidentally, future studies is also a field which has taken the same basic needs orientation as fundamental, encompassing the concerns both of peace and development studies, perhaps with a more constructivist, future-oriented orientation.

Today we are used to such expressions as the International Monetary Fund being the functional equivalent of nuclear weapons in North-South relations. But we are not yet thinking symmetrically about this matter; we usually do not talk about the threat of a war being the functional equivalent of the threat of starvation in East-West relations. And yet we should do: threats often make people irrational. It may focus their attention, but not necessarily in the best direction. Conclusion: to all the problems in connection with the concepts of "peace", "violence" now come the problems of "need". All these problems should be welcomed: experience seems to indicate that questions asked on the basis of these concepts can lead to very fruitful insights and inquiries.

4. From the human space to social, global and nature spaces

Admittedly, the approach just advocated is very anthropocentric. On the other hand, we are human beings; that also applies to peace researchers, hence a certain species centrism is at least understandable.

But then it goes without saying that the implications of any peace research position will have to be explored in the social space of societal constructions and the global space of world systems, as well as the ecological dimensions attached to nature as such. That one can do violence to nature by destroying ecological stability is more than clear to people living in our decade, or at least should be so. But maybe one day we will also talk about violence done to social and global structures? Maybe we would be better at understanding their conditions for self-maintenance and what happens if they are not met? And, could they be isomorphic?

However, the major point about the focus on these four spaces is more classical: to trace the interconnections between them. They may serve as a convenient reference point for the classification of peace theories: is peace/violence rooted in nature, human space, social space or global space? And, having said this, the four spaces also serve as a reminder as to what is meant by "interdisciplinarity" or more ambitiously, a holistic approach. I would say that some knowledge of ecology, psychology, sociology/anthropology/politology/economics and international relations are indispensable; in addition some insight in how all of this is conditioned in space by culture and over time by history. Some time in the future we shall probably have a more integrated peace science (although I myself feel rather repelled by that word for reasons stated above). No doubt it will have to reflect the disciplinary richness indicated so far, certainly also the natural sciences since nature is a part of this totality, and the humanities since culture/history certainly enter.

Conclusion: peace research is particularly attractive for somebody with considerable intellectual appetites, like medicine, and could serve as an example of the wisdom of the old idea of being a generalist and in addition a specialist in one or two fields, for instance arms races/disarmament, or the relation between culture and violence. An ambitious program, but not that extraordinary.

5. Peace research, peace education, peace action

Again, from the very beginning it was rather clear that a commitment to peace, just like a commitment to development for that matter, makes a limitation to research only insufficient. Most people are today rather happy that medical men and women do not regard the spoken or written word in lectures, articles and books as the final outcome of their activities; the final outcome by which they are judged is "health". Correspondingly for development, correspondingly for peace. By that standard we are all failures.

In practise this means that two fields will have to be very closely related to peace research: conveying the findings to others, in other words peace education; working for the realization of the policy implications that can be said to receive some backing through the findings; peace action. In a sense the typical example would be the university professor in medicine, engaged both in research, education of students and less advanced colleagues, and in health action, be that through preventive or curative medicine. That peace research is more controversial than health research does not invalidate this comparison in any significant way: health research was

certainly very controversial two centuries or even one century ago, and is still controversial today. And, there are considerable amounts of material in peace research that is not very controversial although this is not what is highlighted in the press and in public debates that will tend to focus, for good reasons, on what is controversial.

It is interesting to note that when research education and action are somehow integrated in connection with "peace" the accusation is that of radicalism; when they are integrated around the value of "health" today the accusation is often the opposite, conservatism, traditionalism and one talks about the "health establishment" in a way one is not yet talking about the "peace establishment" (although one might certainly talk about the "peace movement establishment"). How this is going to develop further is difficult to say today; I would not be surprised if the intense yearning for peace no matter how that concept is conceived of, after the initial resistance relatively soon might lead to an over-acceptance of peace research - education - action as it is taking shape; today to a large extent carried by the peace movement with the peace researchers functioning as the intelligentsia of the peace movement. And that over acceptance in turn, might easily lead to smugness in any new peace establishment as it has in the old foreign policy/military establishments, maybe particularly because they cut off the relation to research, meaning by that re-search, real research able to question all assumptions, even the most basic ones, even those held by oneself.

In other words, the danger is not that researchers also are interested in education and action. They should be and thereby get some important feed-back from the real world, from people who chal-

lenge the "findings," and from a complicated reality that refuses to respond to actions in the way suggested by the research. Much more dangerous than this would be those who engage in education and action without any research basis and for that reason have a tendency to repeat their own cherished belief, whether those of the establishment or the antiestablishment, and to try to shape the world according to their dogmas. Relatively innocuous in this connection is the researcher who cuts the relation to education and action and lives in the relatively closed world of researchers alone, and the world of books.

6. The social role of the peace researcher

Peace research as an intellectual activity was a rejection of classical peace studies, among other reasons because those who were engaged in it were the servants of their respective establishments, even to the extent that their conclusions could better be predicted from their nationality than from their intellectual orientations. Does this automatically imply that peace researchers will be the servants of the antiestablishments? Except for some cases I do not think it does, and I would very much insist that it should never do. The peace researcher should never give up his most precious possession, intellectual/political freedom and flexibility; the moment he is tied to any social actor, governmental or non-governmental these possessions will be taken away from him. "Who pays the piper calls the tune" applies to most people. The researcher working in a governmental or intergovernmental establishment will very soon find that his task is to deliver the premisses for conclusions already drawn, and drawn by somebody else. And this al-

so applies to antigovernmental actors: the task of the researcher is, with footnotes and documentation, to legitimize stands already taken, to validate dogmas never questioned.

Hence, the position of the peace researcher must be free from any such entanglement, free to think, to speak, to move, to act. One immediate consequence of this is that great care has to be exercised with sponsorship in general and funding in particular. One policy would be to receive funds both from government, non-government and antigovernment (and their counterparts at the international levels) and in such a way that no actor pays more than 50 percent and can direct the enterprise. In practice this may be almost impossible, and hence an other course has to be charted: a buffer between the funding agency and the research institute, a council of some kind, able to absorb the pressures from above in a creative manner. Obviously the two approaches do not exclude each other.

But what happens when the peace researcher starts acting? At this point I can only offer <sup>two</sup> pieces of advise that have come out of my own experience:

First, no double-talk, if you are presenting an analysis of something, always only one version regardless of who the audience is - with the obvious differences that follow from the level of education of the audience, particularly their ability to absorb a more technical presentation. Intensity has its costs, but pays off in the long run!

Second, science is public by its very nature since the criterion of something being scientific also is its intersubjective acceptability. Hence no secrets can be permitted, neither as data nor in the



presentations. Secrecy and science are mutually contradictory; whatever is based on secrets or presented as a secret should be seen as tools of manipulation, power exercises but certainly not as scientific. Stay away from the drunken military who wants to share secrets!

In practice this means that one method of exercising influence as a peace researcher is out: dem Kurfürsten etwas in die Ohren zu flüstern (to whisper something in the ear of the princes ). In no way does this mean that the peace researcher should abstain from associating with princes or their more secular successors these days; it only means that he should never do so unless he can abide by the two rules just mentioned. Intensive dialogues at the top, in the middle, and at the bottom of the local, social and global spaces in which we live are indispensable aspects of peace research, education and action. But there should be no extra advise for the prince no additional insight, higher level version or something like that.

In short, the peace researcher should be flexible and capable of moving in and out of these various niches of society . However, does that not mean that he identifies with nothing and is actually "free" in the worst sense of that word, namely essentially being a parasite?

I would say no I would say that the peace researcher has a problem of identification but not an unsolvable one. To indicate one simple formula: in direct conflict between more or less equal parties where one cannot say that one is suppressing the other but they are simply standing in each other's way I think the role

of the peace researcher is to serve as an inbetween, as a third party, pointing out possibilities that the parties may not have been able to see for themselves. And correspondingly, in a structural conflict between unequal parties with one party obviously dominating the other-with one being Herr, the other being Knecht-it is the task of the peace researcher to side with the Knecht, with the party that already institutionally is the loser and probably has been so for a very long time. But then, he should only side with the Knecht as long as the Knecht is a Knecht; following Albert Camus when the Knecht becomes a new Herr he should side with the new Knecht.

Solidarity with the underdog, in other words - solidarity means to support them even when one is not in 100 percent agreement (in that case support is easy because it is essentially support for oneself). Creative helpfulness, imagination in all relations. And underlying all this: concrete research to find out, empirically how social structures are, in fact operating, so as to know which stands to take, what strategies to work for.

7. On the the strategies of peace action.

In the table next page the reader will find what may look as a rather complicated scheme, but is nothing but the logical consequence of what has been discussed above, spelled out a little bit.

The starting point are the two types of violence, direct and structural, and the two ways of fighting for peace, negatively by avoiding violence ("peace keeping") and positively by building better relations ("peace building"). As methods rather than as goals these approaches have been given names: the dissociative- and associative-approaches, respectively. Put in a simple formula they consist in the following: in the dissociative approach the parties are kept apart, relations are broken; in the associative approach the parties are brought together, relations are built.

The latter, however, presupposes an image of what "peaceful" relations would be like. In other words, it presupposes more precise ideas of what structurally violent relations would be like. I think it is impossible to approach that subject without some comments on the term "exploitation", since that to me was the major stumbling bloc in the theoretical frameworks indicated in this paper. Obviously exploitation has something to do with social interaction involving at least two parties, one getting much more and the other getting much less out of the interaction relative to the input. The question is how we can understand this "getting much more"/"getting much less". I think one should see, in order to understand, this that some of the costs and benefits in social

**Table 2** A map of peace strategies

Fighting for peace = Fighting against violence

Two types of violence: DIRECT (tearing, piercing, crushing, burning, exploding, etc.)

STRUCTURAL (exploitation, penetration, fragmentation, marginalization)

Two ways of fighting: DISSOCIATIVE (keeping parties apart, demolishing false structures)

ASSOCIATIVE (bringing parties together, building true structures)

Fighting against DIRECT VIOLENCE		Fighting against STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE						
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Consciousness formation</li> <li>2. Organization building</li> <li>3. Confrontation</li> <li>4. Fight against dominance</li> </ol>						
		D I S S O C I A T I V E	A S S O C I A T I V E					
		Slow	Quick					
		Actor-oriented	Structure-oriented					
<i>Geographical</i>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Distance</th> <th>Impediments</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>oceans, deserts</td> <td>mountains, rivers</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Distance	Impediments	oceans, deserts	mountains, rivers	<table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>mobility, indirect democracy</td> <td>people stop one activity; people start another</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	mobility, indirect democracy	people stop one activity; people start another
Distance	Impediments							
oceans, deserts	mountains, rivers							
mobility, indirect democracy	people stop one activity; people start another							
<i>Social</i>	<table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>prejudice, stereotypes</td> <td>military, nonmilitary <i>deterrence</i></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	prejudice, stereotypes	military, nonmilitary <i>deterrence</i>	<table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>banishment, seclusion, killing</td> <td>noncooperation, civil disobedience, decoupling</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	banishment, seclusion, killing	noncooperation, civil disobedience, decoupling		
prejudice, stereotypes	military, nonmilitary <i>deterrence</i>							
banishment, seclusion, killing	noncooperation, civil disobedience, decoupling							
<i>Artificial</i>	<table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="2">use of technology, use of third parties</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	use of technology, use of third parties						
use of technology, use of third parties								
		5. Self-reliance						
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Recoupling, on the basis of equity</li> <li>2. Entropy, interaction at all levels, in all directions, not only at the elite level</li> </ol>						
		A S S O C I A T I V E	D I S S O C I A T I V E					
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Symbiosis (making the parties interdependent)</li> <li>4. Broad scope of interdependence (many spheres, widening agendas)</li> <li>5. Large domain (more than two parties, but not too many)</li> <li>6. Superstructure for planning, for problem and conflict articulation and resolution</li> </ol>								

interaction appear between the parties as exchange; some of the costs and benefits accumulate inside the parties as "in-change" as a consequence of the role played, the work done. Regardless of how well one is paid for the oil getting it out and shipped away develops a country less than putting it to use in hundreds and thousands of different enterprises; regardless of how well the typist is payed the work is less developing than to conceive of, formulate and dictate a manuscript.

Exploitation, then, has to do with the sum total of costs and benefits of both sides and their comparison. And at this point there are at least two concepts of exploitation: exploitation as asymmetry, meaning that these two sums are highly unequal; and exploitation as extraction beyond the level of recovery, meaning that the sum is so low or so negative for one of the parties that the result is irreversible damage. That damage shows up somatically as hunger and illness; mentally/spiritually as alienation and repression expressed in the persons hit; as apathy in the last instance.

Hence, a basic point in building peaceful relations would be at least to avoid this second and immediately violent form of exploitation, not in any sense indicating that all hunger, illness and apathy in the world can be traced back to exploitative structures. That condition of non-violent interaction is referred to as equity in the table. And if somebody feels that this is politics, that is certainly true. Politics is that which affects the interests of actors and groups of actors at societal and global levels; these interests are regulated through relations of power;

violence both in its direct and structural forms is an exercise of power; peace is the reduction of violence and consequently has to do with the regulation of power. The struggle for peace is certainly not a struggle "to abolish power" just as little as it is an attempt "to get rid of conflicts"; it is an effort to steer the exercise of power towards non-violent directions and to steer conflicts towards non-violent and creative (positive peace!) forms of conflict resolution. Hence everything that has to do with peace, research education and action is politics from beginning to end, including the aspect one refuses to do research on, refuses to include in a peace education and refuses to consider for peace action.

Nonetheless having said this it is clear that the upper corner on the left hand is what most people associate with peace action. Here are the efforts to bring about absence of violence by keeping parties, particularly countries, apart. This was the classical corner. Much of the discontent, the challenge to which peace research was intended as a response, has to do with this corner. That, however, does not mean that the corner should be given up: it is terrifyingly important, this is where research on arms races, disarmament, arms control and alternative security policies are located. And exactly at this point a major distinction could be added to the table: the distinction between deterrence based on retaliation which will have to be with offensive weapon systems and deterrence based on defense of one's own territory.

This is not the place to go into any detail with the classical corner, nor with the other three. Suffice it only to say

that in the bottom left hand corner are the efforts to build peace and security through cooperation rather than deterrence, leading to the rather basic problem of what kind of cooperative relation is peace-building and what kind is not. The hypotheses in that corner are often seen as less "political" than the entire right hand column dealing with structural violence and for a very simple reason. The associative approach to direct violence consists in bringing parties together, establishing some kind of new relation, whereas the dissociative approach to structural violence consists in breaking up old relations because they are too exploitative. In the first case no party loses; both of them may gain, and one of them might even think that this is a great opportunity for gaining disproportionately much (thus leading to the type of problems that will call into action dissociative structural approaches later on). But in the dissociative approach to structural violence there is no doubt that somebody will be losing, at least in the short run; consequently it is branded as "political" and correctly so.

But the story does not end with dissociation. The whole idea of conceiving of peace both negatively and positively is a way of rejecting the dissociative approach as a goal; it is too negative, too uncooperative, non-integrative even if there may also be harmony in dissociation. The goal lies beyond negative peace, hence the necessity of a positive peace concept in addition. And a critical feature of this positive peace concept is a relation of equity, like when adolescents re-link to their parents after a period of rupture,


gaining maturity through self-reliance and hopefully having parents who understand how to treat their new born children on a basis of equity, in other words as fellow adults.

History is the endless movement of a system in and out of these four cells. The story may start anywhere and end anywhere. By and large the left hand column is more interesting in the analysis of East-West relations and the right hand column in the analysis of North-South relations - but having said that a warning should immediately be issued; both of them apply to both. And the system is capable of infinite refinement. More particularly, extrapolating from this simple little table, putting more meat on the associative approaches, a model of a more peaceful global and social system would emerge based on equity relations and yet with sufficient autonomy to retain that great gift referred to in the upper right hand corner as self-reliance. But that story, in a sense, belongs more to the field of development research than peace research however unseperable the two may be.

8. The methods of peace research.

On the surface peace research is a social science, or a conglomerate of social sciences, just like the others. However, there is a problem, and that problem is to some extent indicated in figure 2:

Figure 2. On scientific activity





Of course peace research depends on data, and of course theories are developed. Further, the two are compared and theories that do not fit the data are discarded. This approach, also known as empiricism, is as indispensable as it is insufficient. Its insufficiency is most clearly seen from the double circumstance that peace research is centered around a complex, problematic value, "peace", and that this value is only very imperfectly and incompletely realized so that very little is available in terms of data about peace on which theories can be tested. Of course, there is more peace than war in human history. But the theory of peace, and the concept of peace, are both relatively rich so that empirical glimpses here and there will tend to give distorted pictures of more complex conceptualizations. One cannot build a general theory of peace for the world on relations between Nordic countries alone, or of disarmament on the basis of Costa Rica. Obviously these cases are special like all cases are; they may be heuristically useful but should not be permitted to limit the thinking about peace to such concrete cases. There are limits to empiricism like to anything else.

Hence the need to elaborate the value of peace as much as the data and the theories. This paper is itself an example of some of the things that happen when a concept is put under magnifying glasses. But then, why should data only be compared to theories? Why could they not be compared to values in a critical manner, meaning that concrete situations are related to the value of peace or its satellite values, and then simply evaluated like when an art critic does the same for a piece of art, or a judge uses the laws of the

country to evaluate the data about a defendant in court?

And then, to go one step further: why should one not relate values and theories directly, in an effort to understand constructively, if only on paper, the conditions under which values associated with peace could be realized? After all, this is what an architect does when he is transcending data. In all these cases, empiricism, criticism and constructivism, the researcher is actually doing something which from a formal point of view has the same structure: reality is divided into two parts such as "observed"/"unobserved" and "desired"/"rejected", and then a search goes on with special focus on the cases of deviance, such as the desired that is unobserved, not to mention the rejected that is observed. Different ways of dealing with the world; the same way of comparing the different ways and the same attention on the mechanisms by which two or three ways of dividing the world may become aligned.

What should peace research do? Of course, all three. There is empirical peace research, by definition dealing with the problems of the past since only the past has generated data; there is critical peace research dealing with the problems of the present, evaluating concrete policies for instance; and there is constructive peace research dealing with blue-prints for the future indicating possible peace strategies. A peace researcher should be in command of all three, and in order to do so he has to get out of the empiricist straightjacket but remain sensitive to the rules of empirical research, particularly in the evaluation of new peace policies. Actually, all of this is trivial. In connection with engineering sciences, and the approach of the architect already alluded to, and

none of these professions is today particularly radical or subversive of the social order. Moreover, in other fields of social activity the empiricism-criticism-constructivism triple is already more than accepted, for instance in connection with that vast conglomerate of social sciences referred to as "education" (which also has some similarities to peace research, incidentally). Hence, the resistance, when peace research gets out of the narrow confines of empiricism into the other two, cannot possibly be explained by reference to the subject matter.

The roots of this resistance, still found in some conservative circles, are certainly located somewhere else: well entrenched power establishments, used to having a monopoly on matters of peace and war, of exploitation and liberation, even protected by secrecy, feel threatened by such attempts. Their immediate reactions will necessarily be of two kinds: either to co-opt the new researchers or to repress them - or possibly both. But such matters belong to the trivia of contemporary social reality, there is nothing particularly new nor particularly inspiring. It just simply is like that, and has always been like that whenever a new branch of research is appearing.

9. What kind of intellectual style for peace research?

One thing is method, quite another thing is the intellectual style in which research is carried out and the findings are presented. The reader will find in Table 3. some efforts to characterize four major intellectual styles in the world today, Saxonian, Teutonic, Gallic, and Nipponic, with obvious indications as to countries in which these styles would be particularly strong:

TABLE 3

A guide to intellectual styles

	Saxonic	Teutonic	Gallic	Nipponic
Paradigm analysis	weak	strong	strong	weak
<u>Descriptions:</u> Proposition-production	very strong	weak	weak	strong
<u>Explanations:</u> Theory-formation	weak	very strong	very strong	weak
<u>Commentary on other intellectuals:</u> -paradigms -propositions -theories	strong	strong	strong	very strong

So, which style is the best one for peace research? Is it the Saxonic strong emphasis on description, on empirical accuracy, and rather negative attitude to theory-formation, referring to almost any theory as "sweeping generalization"? Or, is it the Teutonic emphasis on strict deductions from first principles, theory building in pyramidal form with less emphasis on correspondence with data? Or, is it the Gallic emphasis in the same direction, but with more elegance, more flexibility, more aestheticism and also less pretension that the theory mirrors social reality? Or, is it the Nipponic focus on the world of books rather than the world of reality, with running commentary on other intellectuals, in casu peace researchers?

Again, I feel that the answer has to be all four. Peace research means both data-collection as published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and conceptualization and theory-formation, both of the strictly deductive and of the perhaps more artistic quality. In addition, although possibly of a more secondary nature; they need to take stock of their own house and see what takes place, in other words running commentary on their own activity. There is room for all of this; only not for the person who insists that only one of these approaches is the correct, even universal one, and the others are misunderstandings. Again both-and, not-either-or.

At that point one little comment as a person from Northern Europe. Perhaps one reason why peace research is relatively strong in Northern Europe is that our intellectual style is at least a blend of the Saxon and the Teutonic, of the focus on data-collection and on theory-formation, leading to hypothetical-deductive methodologies. Of artistic elegance there is less, of running commentary also less - that is often left to people from other countries. Certainly this is not the only reason why peace research has had relatively good conditions in three of the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland). Add to this the circumstance that the relations among Nordic countries constitute no bad example of how associative peace can be brought about, to a large extent implementing the strategies mentioned two sections ago. If some reader finds these two comments chauvinistic this is certainly correct; the only difference between our chauvinism and that of other people being that ours reflects reality... But they go far towards explaining the empirical/theoretical approach combine with a certain optimism characteristic of Nordic peace research.

10. Peace and civilization

For anyone who, like the present author, has been doing peace research for more than thirty years the moment comes when one can justifiably ask: in what direction is your research leading? Should I give an answer in one word right now, in 1984, thirty years after I was co-authoring my first publication in the field, on Gandhi's political ethics, I would say: civilization. And this for two reasons.

First, there is too much variation in the practise of violence both in time and in space to warrant the conclusion that is all a question of biology and instincts. The opposite conclusion, that there is no pattern at all and it is only a question of reaction to a myriad of factors that come together as events, is also unsatisfactory. There seem to be patterns: nomadic societies are by and large less aggressive than industrial societies; people in Buddhist societies less aggressive than people in Christian societies, so if we were all Eskimo Buddhists our situation would have been easier. We are not - in fact, for all I know there may be no Eskimo Buddhists around at all. Many of us are living in a Christian, or to use a broader term occidental (including the judaic and the islamic traditions) civilization, and many of us live in industrial societies. The deeper code, or program of a civilization seems at least to be one promising factor worth looking into in the search for the roots of violence of both types, and possibly also for their reduction. That program is what I refer to as (social) cosmology, and it seems

at least highly plausible that there is an expansionist occidental civilizational code that will carry in its wake, almost with necessity, even enormous quantities of direct and structural violence.

Second, there is a more optimistic inspiration to be gained from a civilizational perspective. The word "peace" translates into different words into different languages, all of them having different connotations, showing different facets of "peace". Thus the roman pax typically means "absence of violence", under the rule of law (pacta sunt servanda). Of course, this in no way excludes structural violence: The Roman Empire was replete with structural violence, but at some times a setting within which direct violence was relatively absent, thus permitting structural violence to permeate unabated.

The Greek eirene, the Hebraic shalom and the Arabic sala'am are more pointing towards peace as justice, in other words "absence of structural violence". Since these are occidental cultures that notion is certainly also in occidental civilization.

When we then move eastwards, to the Hindu shanti, peace becomes more like "inner peace", a harmonious state of mind not unknown in Christian thinking. This differs from the Buddhist/Jainist ahimsa, non-violence, because it adds to the peaceful inner state of mind the notion of non-violent behaviour, also structurally, it seems. This was the point of departure for Gandhi's satyagraha, putting ahimsa, to work as direct action, in an aggressive manner, against

direct and structural violence in all its forms and manifestations, but always non-violently.

When we then move still further to the East the Chinese concept of ho p'ing and the Japanese concept of heiwa seem more to carry connotations of social harmony, peacefulness, adjustment-probably compatible not only with structural violence, but also with direct violence.

What I am hinting at is only the following: different civilizations see peace differently. If peace research tries to be not only holistic but also global it is certainly insufficient to deal with peace the way it is conceived of in, for instance, Northern Europe. Somehow all of this should be taken into account: absence of direct violence/absence of structural violence; inner/outer; violent methods/non-violent methods; harmony/ disharmony. Some combinations of these dimensions have been given expressions in the cultures mentioned; there are many other human cultures, no doubt there are other peace concepts. It is as if somewhere there was once a rich, holistic peace concept which was then split into several components, one component being given to each part of humankind. And thus it comes that not only is there plenty of unpeace in a fragmented humanity; the concept of peace is itself fragmented.

Research problem : what are the consequences of that? And what is the relation between the two aspects of the focus on civilization: to what extent is the peace concept an articulation of civilizational biases, to what extent does the concept itself favor some policies rather than others?



### Conclusion

This last point is important: maybe it is the task of the peace research to try to put together what has been so effectively fragmented and pitted against each other in a highly destructive manner, including the concept of peace itself. I am not the slightest worried that this will should lead to a homogeneous world state: there will always be more than enough contradictions around, emerging out of the very effort to put things together. But humanity in general, and peace in particular, are today divided in a most destructive manner. Something has to be done about it.

Peace research, then, stands out as one tiny little effort. I have tried to indicate how important it was openly to admit peace as a value, to be made explicit and to be explored as problematic. And from that point on all the challenges mentioned have some of the same structure: something has been found insufficient, something new has been developed and after that a both-and emerges rather than an either-or.

One may ask: what about peace research in the future? I could imagine a couple of points. Thus I think natural sciences and humanities have to be brought in much more effectively; the field has been too much dominated by social sciences. Further, the last dimension hints very definitely to the significance of a transcultural, not only transnational, perspective. Then,

peace research should liberate itself from a materialistic bias dealing with bodies, dead or alive, healthy or not healthy - in other words with mortality and morbidity only, and not with the mental and spiritual dimensions of violence and human growth and development. No doubt this would lead to a further development of the theory of needs , particularly the classes of freedom and identity needs, singly and combined.

I have already pointed to the need for integration of the four spaces, not only by tracing interconnections, but also by establishing more isomorphisms between them. Systems theory is supposed to do this. There is much to be fetched there, no doubt there could also be other approaches.

Whereas this would be research, the major challenges of the 1980's are certainly peace-education and peace action. Due to the UN and UNESCO resolutions many countries are now having great internal debates as to how peace education could be carried out. This is a field where many peace researchers have already launched themselves, and hopefully will continue to do so, seeing it as a very important opportunity to test the thinking in dialogues that are educational to both sides. And the same goes for the peace action possibilities, with the peace researchers as the intelligentsia of the peace movement, and the security researchers or defense intellectuals as the intelligentsia of governmental establishments, sometimes only shades away from what might be called the "war movement". All of this will test the peace researchers' ability to establish an identity of his own and to lead a life

in reasonable integrity; it will certainly not be easy. But all the same his task will be to develop new peace strategies; to be imaginative, constructive and critical but also empirical, and to know how to present his findings.

If in addition to this the cultural sensitivity could lead the peace researcher to see the danger of ethnocentrism not only in other but also in himself much would be gained.

No small bill, indeed. But then, who said that the life of a peace researcher should be unproblematic? We are only 15 years away from year 2000, let that be the next resting point in time to take stock. Hopefully, at that point we should be able to say: our activity has not only resulted in an enormous amount of lectures and talks, in articles and books; but also in less violence more peace.

## NOTES

1. The five persons were Ingrid Eide (later assistant professor of sociology, University of Oslo, MP and Undersecretary of Education), Mari Holmboe Ruge (later secretary of the social science section of the Norwegian Council for Research in Science and the Humanities, and Head of Section in the Ministry of Labor), Arne Martin Klausen (later professor of anthropology) and Sivert Langholm (later professor of history) — and myself, peace researcher in search of macro-spatial, macro-temporal and macro-disciplinary perspectives. I mention this to indicate that not only the roads into but also from peace research are many, usually preserving much of the basic perspective.

And that basic perspective was inter-disciplinary as seen from the list and rather global in its focus. The first five research projects were on general conflict theory, on technical assistance, on the history of duels as conflict resolution mechanism, on the theory and practice of summit meetings, and on attitudes to nuclear power. Only one of these projects (no. 4) could be seen as limited to the East-West perspective, and even so the focus was on general theory. As far as PRIO is concerned Yoshikazu Sakamoto is misinformed when he states ("Report on the Activities of the International Peace Research Association - 1982", IPRA Newsletter, vol. XXI, no. 3/1983, p. 40) that there was a "preoccupation with the problems in the North alone". But, maybe such myths are useful in making the work relevant "to the critical issues confronting the people of the world"? (loc.cit).

2. At the Győr conference this was the case with Mario Borelli, Magnus Haavelsrud and Håkan Wiberg. There will be many others in the time to come.
3. For a description of a really elitist research institution, see my article in *Radius*, spring 1984, on the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, reprinted in the *Mitteilungsblatt* of the Technische Universität, Berlin, June 1984.
4. The first systematic presentation of this perspective by the present author was given at the Nordic Summer University, Tampere, August 1962, unprinted manuscript.
5. See 'An Editorial', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1964, pp. 1-4, for an early example of this type of thinking. Kenneth Boulding does not agree: 'I think it [peace research] did get a little distracted. Partly, this is my good friend Johan Galtung's fault. I am very fond of Johan but he really perverted the peace research movement into something that is too grand to manage: the idea of positive peace, etc. — I am not going to throw it out of the window altogether, by any means — but it seems to me that negative peace is much more important, that is, just the prevention of war. In a certain sense, the movement has rather lost interest in this and I think that was unfortunate' (Boulding, 1984, p. 19).

I disagree doubly with my equally good friend Kenneth Boulding: there are so many states of affairs that do not include war but cannot possibly be said to include peace either; and the peace research movement has been very active in the field of war prevention and arms race research the last five years, after a focus during the 1970s on problems of development. When it comes to priorities, particularly for peace researchers in the first and second worlds right now, in our present desperate situation, I could easily agree with Kenneth, but I do not want to erect any barriers saying 'here, not further — that territory belongs to someone else!'

6. This is the reason for my early use of the word 'structural' in the title of so many articles, starting with an article on aggression published 1964 — see *Essays in Peace Research*, Vols. III and IV on peace and social structure/world structure respectively.

7. The Bhopal disaster 1984 differs from this process in being quicker, so quick that it looks more like direct violence and the question of guilt and punishment, morally and/or legally, arises.

Thus, the theme "structural violence" leads to considerable debate. The reason is obvious: whereas direct violence in many circles is seen as a legitimate response to direct violence, as self-defense against (unprovoked) aggression, conceiving of such phenomena as exploitation, extreme social injustice or inequality as some kind of violence (structural) may open for the possibility of not only responding with direct violence - as has been done throughout history - but legitimately doing so. Thus, the sentence "Strukturelle Gewalt fordert insbesondere in den Entwicklungsländern jährlich Opfer in den Grössenordnungen mancher Kriege" in a draft paper for the West German conference of ministers of culture on peace education in the schools had to be left out before it could be presented to a social democrat minister of defense (Hans Apel, see Der Spiegel, No. 49 1981). The debate in DGFK-Informationen over "strukturelle Gewalt" (nos. 1/79, 2/79 and 1/80) is very clear and a good introduction to the issue.

However, the most ambitious critique of the concept is found in Houweling, H.W. and Siccama, J.G., "Refining Violence, Peace and War", Acta Politica, Vol. XV, October 1980. They take the stand that "violence is characterized by elements of drama, which makes the concept clearly distinguishable from, for example, mass starvation" (p. 502). This is precisely the position I reject, so the point of disagreement is well defined. To me this is a clear way of favoring the actor-oriented as opposed to the structure-oriented perspective on social affairs with all the colossal biases that entails (see Galtung 1980a, ch. 2.1 for an exploration in favor of a both-and perspective). Does there have to be an actor enacting a drama, even with intent, for a phenomenon to deserve the moral disapproval and militant rejection that we often associate with reactions to (unprovoked) violence?

But the basic point is more pragmatic: "Galtung's redefinition can also foster the killing of members of the elite who are held responsible for the existence of "structural" violence" (p. 503). That this happens in history is certainly true, but hardly because of some "conceptual innovation" (p. 501). Anyhow, the two authors have difficulty with my definition of violence; I have the same difficulty with any definition of "peace" that permits any amount of structural violence as long as there is no enactment of violence as "drama".

My own view of the pragmatic question, how does one react to structural violence (colonialism, apartheid, one gender suppressing the other) is as follows. Direct counterviolence can be condoned under the following conditions:

- (1) All possible nonviolent responses have been tried first, from parliamentary/constitutional (when applicable) to extra-parliamentary/non-constitutional.
- (2) The structural violence is intolerable in the sense of making satisfaction of basic needs (survival, well-being, freedom, identity) impossible for large numbers or groups.
- (3) The direct violence applied is minimal, precise and with a reasonable expectation of success (not wanton violence).
- (4) The organization for direct violence is dismantled after its use.
- (5) There is no cult of direct violence of its heroes afterwards.

Most countries have in their history wars of liberation from some kind of structural violence where some, not all, of such rules were adhered to.

8. Thus, I do not agree with Maslow in the assumption of a hierarchy of needs and find that in general there is a rich man, Western man, urban man bias.
9. Hinduism also has a quarter of basic values: Dharma (duty), Artha (possessions), Kama (pleasure) and Moksha (liberation) — but with the important additional point that there is no hierarchy, they are all to be pursued. She he who pursues only one is seen as heading for losing even that one.
10. This is what I am currently working on: a theory for 'maturity' in all four spaces, drawing on some of the insights gained from ecological research. Let me just hasten to add: I have never thought of any perspective as *the* perspective, the final one — only as one more perspective, trying to squeeze out of the perspective as much insight as possible. Critics sometimes miss that point, believing that I believe in a theory as the only theory possible.
11. In 1967 I wrote the first draft of a *Theories of Peace*, under contract with UNESCO. Never published, it is now being totally revised and is — 'forthcoming' (together with a *Theories of Conflict* written in 1973). Maybe it was rather good they were not published...
12. This is a typical characteristic of UN research, a basic part of the anthropology of the UN as a research establishment, probably the world's largest when taken as a whole.

Of course, peace researchers are being used, and abused. The trick is to have contact with the devil, yet retain freedom of speech, publication and action. The difficulty is that the "clients", as mentioned, want their dogmas validated by research. For a brilliant presentation of precisely this point, see Egbert Jahn, "Friedensforschung unter dem sanften Zwang der Ausgewogenheit", Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 May 1981: "diese Freunde der Friedensforschung versuchen mit uns umzugehen wie jener letzte König von Hannover, von dem Carl von Ossietzky den Ausspruch überliefert hat: "Huren und Professoren kann man immer haben".

13. Thus, in the early years of PRIO this was certainly the theory and practice of getting launched. The Council for Conflict and Peace Research was a very useful buffer in this regard, administering funds from the Ministry of Education to the fledgling institute. But even if the theory is good this pluralistic funding structure is very labor-intensive, and sometimes not very capital-intensive.
14. The theme of exploitation is developed for inter-human relations in Galtung (1970), and for inter-societal relations in Galtung (1971).
15. My book *There Are Alternatives* (Galtung, 1984a) (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984 — German, Dutch, Spanish, Norwegian translations available; Danish, Swedish, Italian, Japanese and French *on the way*). The book is an effort to be very concrete, translating peace research into peace politics with very concrete, immediate steps that can be taken today in many countries. At this point a little greeting to my friends Boulding and Rapoport: your theories are excellent, but you have still to match Charles Osgood in concreteness, in something that also captures the political mind! Good luck.
16. Thus, the Nordic countries are atypical among many reasons in being very similar in size, at least the four bigger ones, with no intra-Nordic problem of being a small country next to a superpower, with the possibilities of canadization and finlandization and what is considerably worse (the fate of Mexico 1846-48, of Eastern Europe 1945). And the disarmament of Costa Rica should be seen in the light of the major use of the army in South America: for military coups, mainly to preserve the social order — which in Costa Rica is relatively egalitarian. Consequently there is less need for military coups from above or below, and less need for an army.

17. See my article 'Social Cosmology', *Alternatives*, 1981. This is only a first effort, to be followed by a book (forthcoming, 1986). As a preview of this type of analysis, see my *Hittlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1985), also in Norwegian, Spanish, German, French.

In Hedlund, H. and Norberg, J., "Theoretical Primitiveness About Primitive Belligerence, A Critique of Wright, Broch and Galtung", Uppsala University, December 1973 (Fredsforskning - Analys och debatt 5) the 1966 approach is criticized, and probably with some justification. However, I have an argument in defense perhaps not so much of Wright's way of using the data as of the effort to group a number of variables together in an index of primitivity/civilization to test it against belligerence: the correlations found are so enormous (from 0% "economic and political war" at the most primitive level of social organization to 95% at the highest) that even if there are some misclassifications and some doubts about some variables the finding is probably robust enough to stand up. That there is more to the issue than transpires from that paper I would readily agree.

18. A major finding by an international team directed by the present author, published in Ormauer et al. (1976) was how unprepared the population was to think concretely in terms of peace, how helpless they felt — and how high, even on top, the value of peace came as their concern.

Of course, there is no agreement about this among peace researchers. The classification made by Ashjerr Pille, "Methods and Problems in Peace Research, A Value-Based Approach", International Social Science Journal, vol. XXV, no. 1/1974) remains useful as a guide to the territory, with a minimalist school (absence of international war between sovereign states, possibly based on deterrence); a middle school defining peace not only as the absence of war but also the absence of threat systems, and a third school extending the concept of peace to comprise the absence of all kinds of violence. Structural violence is to be eliminated through social reconstruction even if it does not threaten to erupt into direct violence. Pille then sees two variants of this third school: those who accept struggle for peace only with peaceful means, and those who would condone liberating violence against oppression. My own position is this: in principle I belong to the third school, variant no. one. But I accept this list as a listing of priorities, giving first priority to the minimalist approach, and more particularly to the research on how to avert nuclear inter-state wars. Then comes the research on alternatives to threat systems, for instance on defensive, non-provocative defense (Galtung, 1984a). And then the general approach, with first priority to nonviolent approaches and only as a last resort to "liberating violence".

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